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Abstract: Facing the general trend towards larger but fewer farms since 1935, the
US government implemented a protective safety net for small farmers during 1933-96
which did not halt it but incurred market distortions and other drawbacks. It then switched
to market oriented measures in 1996 which have made small farmers more exposed to
market risks. A suitable solution to both preserving small and strengthening large farms has
not been found. This paper provides a proposal not included in the 145 recommendations
in the report `A Time to Act' by the National Commission on Small Farms of the USDA
in January 1998: to promote part ownership of land by encouraging small farmers to
develop off-farm activities and lease the land beyond self-need to part owners (including
competent small farmers) to boost large farmers. In this way, while part owners could
achieve economies of scale, small farmers would be boss of self-used land and landlord
of rented-out land, integrated with large farmers, gain more income from rent, increase
time for and earnings from off-farm activities, so that small farmers, rural communities,
democracy roots and landscape could be conserved. It shows an example of how some
black farmers who were small in terms of owned land but became large after renting in
land achieved success in farming. Although part ownership has been increasing, it has
never been promoted as a policy direction and even be neglected. This proposal may be
relevant to other OECD countries with a large versus small bimodal farm structure.
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     2 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development includes 29 countries:
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,
UK, USA (original members in 1960), Japan (joined in 1964), Finland (1969), Australia
(1971), New Zealand (1973), Mexico (1994), Czech (1995), Hungary, Poland and South
Korea (1996).
     3 For example, in the United Kingdom, large farms are very competitive, but `the
squeeze on agriculture is likely to be felt most keenly by the small, poorer farms, and this
in turn raises another issue: that of the effect of agricultural decline on social and economic
life in rural communities' (WE 1993: 580). The very similar Canadian case is analyzed
comprehensively in the Special Issue of `Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics'
1995.
     4 For instance, in Portugal, `the growth of part-time farming in some regions  ...
fossilized the farm structure, with the off-farm income allowing families to retain small,
uneconomic holdings' (WE 1993: 464). It has become the last obstacle in sustainable rural
development Japan, South Korea and other rice-based economies in monsoon Asia, see
Zhou (1997) and Zhou (1999).
     5 For example, in March 1998 the Commission of the European Union made this its
Agenda 2000 (EC DGVI 1998a & 1998b).
OECD (1998: 15-87) reports that in its member countries in general2, there has
been a long-term trend towards larger but fewer farms, namely, larger farmers have
achieved lower costs by economies of scale while small farmers been put in an inferior
position as either being crowded out from agriculture or to the margin of it (keeping in
mind a caveat that a few of them have become large).3 Until the mid-1990s, many
governments maintained a protective safety net aimed at retaining small farms, but the
subsidies largely went to the few large farmers while markets had been distorted and
budget burden increased. The development of off-farm activities in recent decades has had
the positive result of slowing small farmers' exiting, but also the negative consequences of
decreasing land mobility towards more efficient large farmers.4 Although part ownership
of land tenure has developed, it has not been raised as a new policy direction. Since the
mid-1990s, many governments have begun to adopt market-oriented policies, by reducing
market-distorting supports and providing transitory direct income support, with the long-
term aim of establishing a `farming without subsidies'.5 The market-oriented measures
would be unfavorable to the already weak small farmers, and more exiting by them is
anticipated. Thus governments wish to not only strengthen large farmers for reducing costs
and promoting competitiveness, but also retain small farmers in agriculture and rural areas
for protecting environmental landscape and avoiding aggravating the already serious urban3
     6 For example, 80 % of a random sample of adults in 1987 expressed that `the family
farm (not referring to large family corporate farm) is an essential part of our heritage and
must be preserved' (Jordan & Tweeten 1987: 3), and the small farms `are exactly the
farms that the American public seems most eager to protect' (Gardner 1995: 277).
     7 This model, unseen in the literature, is presented in Zhou (1999) in detail.
     8 For simplicity reason, in this article, unless specified, small farmers include medium
farmers as opposed to large farmers in the USA.
unemployment and homelessness.6 But no effective solutions have yet been found to match
these two seemingly contradictory goals.
In order to find a solution, this article analyzes the typical case: the USA. The
American model of rural development started in 1783 with eight features.7
1. Institutional changes for setting up an individual land ownership after the War
for Independence (1775-83) in the North and Civil War (1861-65) in the South.
2. Government policies supporting agricultural production.
3. Commercialization of the individual farming units leading to large farmers and
driving small farmers to an inferior position.
4. Technological progress, managerial resources, rural development, procurement
and marketing facilities further strengthening large farmers.
5. Government protective safety net (1933-96) failing to prevent the trend towards
fewer but larger farms since 1935 and retain small farmers from being crowded out from
agriculture.
6. Government market-driven measures since 1996 leaving small farmers more
exposed to free market forces.
7. Part ownership of land tenure dominating since 1950 but never being promoted
as a policy direction or a new round of institutional changes.
8. The development in recent decades of off-farm employment pursued as
subordinate to the loss-making independent small farming resulting in inefficient land-
holding and only slowing but not halting small farmers' exiting farming.
Because these features are compatible with those already described by the above-
cited OECD report, only features 7 and 8 are dealt with below.
Performance of Part Owners
In order to find a solution to both strengthening large and preserving small farms,
let us first look at the performance of part owners of land.84
     9 1 acre = 0.4047 ha.
The US land tenure structure includes three types of tenure of operators: full
owners who operate only land they own; part owners who operate both land they own
and rent in (as part ownership and part tenancy); and tenants who operate only land they
rent in (as full tenancy) (Janssen 1993: 473). More specifically, there are full owner
operators (operating their own land and not renting in or out any land), full owner operator
landlords (operating some of their own land and renting out some of it, but not renting in
any land), part owner operators (operating their own land and land rented in, not renting
out land), part owner operator landlords (operating some of their own land and renting out
some of it, and operating land rented in), tenant owner operators (owning land but not
operating it and not renting it out, only operating land rented in), tenant owner operator
landlords (owning land but not operating it, renting out some or all of their own land, only
operating land rented in), nonoperator landlords (not operating any land, but renting out
some or all of their own land), and nonoperator nonlandlords (reporting the ownership of
land, but not operating it or any other land, and not renting it out) (Harris & Gilbert 1985:
34-5).
Trend in the evolution of the land tenure structure. Table 4 shows that during
1900-92, the number of farms under full owners and full tenants decreased from 1920 and
1935 respectively, while that of farms under part ownership, though reduced from 1950,
was still higher in 1992 than in 1900. Table 5 indicates that the acreage of farms under full
ownership and full tenancy dropped from 1910 and 1935 respectively, while that of farms
under part owners, although declined from 1978, was nevertheless much larger in 1992
than in 1900; and since 1950, part ownership has been the major form of land tenure.
Table 6 demonstrates that during 1978-92, the percentage of farms under full owners in
all farms fell, while that of farms under part owners grew continuously, along the increase
of farm acreage; within small farms (1-49 acres9) and lower medium farms (50-179
acres), full owners were the majority; in medium farms of 180-499 acres, they were still
more than part owners (the data did not distinguish lower medium farms of 180-259 acres
and upper medium farms of 260-499 acres); but for upper medium farms (500-999 acres)
and large farms (1 000 and more acres), it was part owners who took majority; in
contrast, full tenants were minority in all categories of farms. Therefore, the trend in the US5
land tenure structure has experienced the reduction of full owners and full tenants, but an
increase and dominance of part owners.
Superiority of part owners over full owners and full tenants. The major
reason why part owners could have gained increase and dominance is that they have
achieved larger acreage and could thus benefit from economies of scale, lower production
costs in general, and be competitively stronger, as revealed in Table 7.
Advantages in increasing farm size by part ownership. How could the part
owners achieve larger acreage? Here an analysis of the major advantages and disadvan-
tages of the full ownership, full tenancy and part ownership of farmland is useful.
The main advantages of full farmland ownership by farm operators include (1)
greater security of tenure, (2) greater managerial freedom and independence, (3) earlier
purchase could avoid the impact of further price rising, (4) farmland can be used for loan
collateral, (5) land ownership reflects prestige, may be a family heritage, and can be
passed on to heirs. The chief disadvantages are (1) reduced working capital due to
farmland debt servicing, (2) mortgage payments may exceed net returns from the
purchased land, (3) compared with investment in farm machinery, livestock or operating
inputs, capital for buying land may bring lower current rate of return, and (4) farmers with
limited capital and sole reliance on farmland ownership often find it difficult to increase
farm size. (Kay 1981: 252)
The principal benefits from full tenancy of farmland by operators consist of (1)
higher flexibility in deciding farm size, (2) more elastic financial obligations, compared to
typical land purchase arrangements (mortgage or installment), and (3) greater working
capital for buying machinery, livestock, or operating inputs. The key shortcomings are (1)
farm size reduction due to dis-renewal of lease, (2) poor facilities and reluctance of lessors
and lessees to invest in land improvement (Kay 1981: 252), (3) fragmentation owing to
non-adjacency of leased parcels.
Part ownership permits operators to acquire the right to use farmland without
obtaining ownership, which allows them to increase farm size while conserving capital from
purchasing land (Janssen 1993: 470, 476), and avoiding the disadvantages of full tenancy.
Part owners have already owned some land, upon which the problems of withdrawal and
low incentive of investment in land improvement could be avoided, and fragmentation6
could be solved by joining parcels through land consolidation. In contrast, full tenants do
not have such a base.
Upon the leased land, how to avoid the problems of withdrawal and low
incentive of investment in land improvement? In 1986, a common questionnaire for
farmland leasing survey was mailed to 5 800 Nebraska and 4 100 South Dakota landlords
and renters - a random sample of 5 % of the total in the two states, and completed by 1
615 Nebraska and 1 155 South Dakota respondents (Johnson; Janssen; Lundeen &
Aiken 1987. Lundeen & Johnson 1987. Peterson & Janssen 1988). The survey provided
useful answers.
There were two major methods for resolving the problem of withdrawal.
The first was multiple leasing - leasing land from more than one landlord by farm
operators. This has been the rule rather than exception. Also, most operators with multiple
leasing combined cash and share leases [common types of farmland leasing arrangements
in the USA are crop sharing, cash rent, and livestock sharing (Janssen 1993: 470)]. Thus,
a sophisticated process of land resource control via farmland rental was adopted by
lessees. In so doing, their risks related with losing any one parcel have been reduced. It
also suggested that many renters may have more knowledge of and experience with
farmland rental agreements than many landlords.
The second method was informal and short-term, but de facto long-term
leasing. Despite a 27 % of absentee landlord ownership (residing in another state) and
multiple leasing among renters, most leasing agreements were relatively informal (verbal)
and short-term (annual). This facilitated not only dis-renewal of leasing but also adjustment
of rental rates.
In cropland leasing of these two states, crop sharing was dominant. In almost all
cases, landlords could get one-third, two-fifths or a half of crop output, depending on the
region, quality of land and crops grown.
75 % of crop share lease respondents reported that the landlord and tenant shared
expenses for one or more variable inputs, but less than 10 % stated sharing all variable
input expenses. In almost all crop share leases, the proportion of input sharing was the
same as in output sharing. Fertilizer was the most commonly shared input, followed by
insecticide or herbicide. Input costs were more likely to be shared on tracts with relatively7
     10 There are 19 rice-based economies in monsoon Asia: China (mainland), Japan,
North Korea, South Korea and Taiwan Province of China in East Asia; Cambodia,
high per acre input costs.
Cash leases completely dominated rangeland and pasture leases, with cash rent
per acre or per animal. Cash leases also accounted for 40 % in South Dakota and 28 %
in Nebraska of cropland acres leased. Cash rental rates changed annually.
While 75 % of renters were highly dependent on net farm income, rent accounted
for less than 30 % of total household income for most landlords.
However, except for the annual changes of cash rental rates, the incidence of
change in the details of share and cash agreements were infrequent. Moreover, the typical
lease agreement had been in effect for more than a decade and most respondents reported
considerable satisfaction with their leasing agreements. 
Therefore, although the leasing agreements were informal and short-term, the
result was a de facto long-term leasing. This, in the author's view, was chiefly because the
informal and short-term agreements gave incentives to tenants to cherish the leasing,
removed the concern of landlords that leased land may not be taken back, and facilitated
the adjustment of rental rates to a balanced satisfaction of both lessors and lessees.
On the leased land, how is it possible to overcome the obstacle of low
incentive of investment in land improvement by both lessors and lessees? The answer
already exists in the above account. In principle, because the leasing contract was informal
and short-term, in order to obtain its renewal, the lessee would have the incentive to
improve the land. In specific measures, sharing input costs in the same proportion as
sharing crop output between landlord and tenant joined them together to improve the land
for their common interests.
How to solve the issue related to fragmentation due to the non-adjacency of
leased parcels? Physically, it would not always be possible to join leased parcels
together, since the same parcels might be leased to other tenants, which would lead to re-
split of the united ones. However, as Table 2 has shown, in 1992, only 8.6 % of the US
farms were smaller than 10 acres (= 4.047 ha) which are very large farms in monsoon
Asia, and 28.8 % of farms under 50 acres (= 20.235 ha) which are normally unimaginable
in monsoon Asia.10 Therefore, even if parcels are not adjacent, each parcel may still be8
Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam in Southeast
Asia; and Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka in South Asia.
large enough to use large machinery, and fragmentation would not cause a serious
problem. 
Being able to achieve the advantages of full ownership and tenancy while avoiding
their disadvantages, part owners tend to rent in more acres than full tenants, as a
comparison between the 1951 survey of farmland rental market in Nebraska and South
Dakota and the above-mentioned 1986 survey in the same states shows (Hurlburt 1954.
Janssen & Johnson 1989). Thus part owners could realize larger farm size than full owners
and full tenants.
Senilization and feminization of nonoperator landlords. Landlords in many
cases are reluctant to sell farmland because it is a family heritage. Many of them were
raised on farms, have some farm management experience and are more familiar with
farmland as an investment opportunity. Rates of return to farmland ownership (current
rates plus expected capital appreciation) have been competitive with many other long-term
investments. (Janssen 1993: 476). Moreover, many landlords are unwilling to rent out
land.
The 1986 survey in Nebraska and South Dakota discovered that nonoperator
landlords were often near or past retirement age - 84 % of women respondents were
nonoperator landlords and a majority were over 65 years of age; women were 40 % of
nonoperator landlords and only 10 % of farm operator respondents. Full tenants were the
youngest group. Between these two extremes were part owner operators and full owner
operator landlords.
Similarly, beyond these two states, Harris and Gilbert (1985) have made a
comparison between the 1946 and 1978 nation-wide Land Ownership Survey by the US
Department of Agriculture and found that nonoperator landlords were the oldest group,
followed by full owner operator landlords, full owner operators, and part owner operators,
with full tenants as the youngest. The majority of male landowners were full owner
operators and the majority of female landowners were nonoperator landlords. 
The above data of tenure by age may be explained to some extent by the ordinary
life cycle of farm occupation. Start-up farmers may rent in land when their capital is short,9
the successful part of them may later buy some land, then purchase more, further expand
by renting in more, when aging cut operations to their owned land, and finally rent out land
first on crop sharing and then cash leasing. (Wunderlich January 1999). Therefore, a
tendency could be perceived that as long as a landowner is physically still able-bodied,
one would be reluctant to rent out land. In contrast, because old and female landowners
are not or less able-bodied, they are more willing to lease land.
Successful black farmers: an example. Compared with large farmers, small
ones have been in a worse situation, and black farmers the worst in general. But a small
group of black farmers in Louisiana have been highly successful.
McLean-Meyinsse and Brown (1994) made a survey to a sample of 15 of the 46
outstanding black farmers listed by the US Soil Conservation Service in Louisiana. They
mainly produced soybean, sugar cane, rice and wheat. Respectively in 1986-88, they
achieved average gross sales of $ 95 000, $ 84 000 and $ 78 000 (the lower sales in
1988 were attributed to the drought); 20 %, 33 % and 40 % of them realized gross sales
over $ 100 000, thus equaling large farms in gross sales. In contrast, in 1987, the gross
sales of 64.8 % of all farms  and  91 % of all black-operated farms in the USA was below
$ 25 000, and of a typical black farmer in Louisiana only $ 15 551 (Table 3. BCUS
1987). Due to their higher farming income, less than 30 % of them resorted to off-farm
activities, while 74 % of all black farmers in Louisiana had to do so (BCUS 1987).
McLean-Meyinsse and Brown find that their success was related to (1) younger
age [80 % of the sampled farmers was below 50 years old, while a typical black farmer
in Louisiana 57.6 in 1987 (BCUS 1987)], (2) a better level of education (40 % of them
had completed high school and three obtained some college education), (3) good
management, (4) early adoption of new technology, (5) love of farming and sound work
ethics, (6) strong family support (which provided the bulk of labor; some of them hired
labor mainly in the planting and harvesting seasons), (7) participation of government
programs, and (8) larger farm size [80 % of them on average operated 488 acres while
a typical black farmer in Louisiana only 110 acres in 1987 (BCUS 1987)].
How did these black farmers achieve larger farm size? 13 owned 19-270 acres,
while nine owned less than 50 acres. Most of the average 488 acres were rented in.
Therefore, they were part owners (but McLean-Meyinsse and Brown do not include this10
concept in their article).
In terms of the owned land in acreage, nine of them were still small farmers (1-49
acres), four lower medium (50-259 acres) or just entered upper medium (260-999 acres).
But thanks to part ownership and part tenancy, they reached average 488 acres as upper
medium farms, thus being able to benefit from economies of scale and achieving success
in farming.
Part ownership has never been promoted as a policy direction. There are
economists who have noted the contribution of part ownership of farmland to the success
of both large and small farmers, but ignored it. The typical example is the above-cited
McLean-Meyinsse and Brown who revealed that part ownership (although they do not
possess this term) was one of the factors of the highly successful black farmers in
Louisiana who were small farmers in terms of land owned. However, part ownership did
not get a place in the `Policy Recommendations' of their article. Rather, in the `Summary
and Conclusions', they emphasize that `potential black farmers must be aware of available
opportunities to borrow funds to purchase land'. (McLean-Meyinsse & Brown 1994: 79-
82)
Interestingly and puzzlingly, even these black farmers themselves disregarded part
ownership, as `they indicated that although their future in farming appeared favorable, they
would not actively encourage their children to continue farming. To them, the main farm
problems today were lack of land at affordable prices, and high costs of getting started in
farming.' (McLean-Meyinsse & Brown 1994: 78-9). It is true that land is and will still be
very expensive to purchase, but why can their children not inherit their own small, and rent
in other, land to enjoy the similar `favorable future'?
There are also economists who slightly recommend part ownership. For instance,
Janssen (1993: 476, 495) notices `the dominant trend to part ownership since 1950' and
elaborates it. However, in the overall conclusion, he merely states that `Farm management,
resource and policy economists should continue: (1) to monitor ongoing changes in land
tenure, ownership and rental market; (2) to examine probable socio-economic
consequences of alternative changes in tenure and ownership patterns; and (3) to
recommend specific changes which improve efficiency and equity of leasing agreements.'
Apparently, he does not raise part ownership to such a high position as a deliberate policy11
     11 Jefferson (President 1800-08) pronounced an agrarianism which has influenced
farmers and farm policy throughout the US history. He believed that a wide distribution
of land ownership provides the backbone for a democratic government (Harris & Gilbert
1985: 31). It still `remains an American belief today' (Brewster 1979). Jefferson's ideal
farmer `yeoman' provided for his (her) family from his own land by his own efforts and
achieved self-sufficiency. He (she) carried on a self-dependent agriculture, buying and
selling as little as possible. He did not rent in his land but owned it in fee simple. He did his
own work. As an independent, self-supporting member of the society, he was his own
boss, responsible for his own managerial decisions. (Rasmussen & Stanton 1993: 32.
USDA 1998). According to Wunderlich (1999), Jefferson also stated that when
opportunities were superior outside of agriculture, farmers should and would move out
(Letter to John Jay, Paris, 23 August 1785), but this point has been paid little attention.
direction or a new round of institutional changes.
Most recommendations advocate the unsustainable full owners and less stable full
tenants. For example, very recently, a comprehensive report by the National Commission
on Small Farms of the USDA in January 1998, dedicated to `Thomas Jefferson, who
envisioned the "yeoman" farmer as the bedrock of American democracy'11, provides a
considerable amount - 145 - recommendations on promoting small farmers. Although it
sporadically mentions to extend credit and tax exempt to beginning farmers to buy and
lease land, its aim was to foster full owners and full tenants, rather than promoting part
ownership (in fact there is no such term in the text).
Major Effects of Off-Farm Activities on Small Farmers
The second issue to examine for finding a solution to both strengthening large and
preserving small farms is the major effects of off-farm activities on small farmers.
Off-farm income helped maintain loss-making small farming. Off-farm work
exists among operators of all farm sizes. On average, off-farm income contributed to 31
% of total farm household income in 1950,  55 %  in  1970,  62 % in 1982, and 87 % in
1993 (US Congress 1986. Tweeten 1995).
Specifically, a few large farms could gain farm earnings as the largest proportion
of their family income, while the large number of small farm families have had little or no
farm income and received almost all their income from off-farm sources (Bollman;
Whitener & Tung 1995: 24). The lower the total income of farm families, the more
dependent they are on off-farm income to maintain family well-being. In many cases, off-
farm employment is crucial to the continuation of small farming. (Gebremedhin & Christy12
     12 In the literature no data have been found to indicate that at least some small farmers
are making economically irrational decisions with land they own (farming it when they
could earn a higher return by renting it out). But there may be two causes for no data on
a phenomenon: (1) this phenomenon does not exist at all; (2) it exists, but no data have yet
been collected. With the reports of Ahearn, Jones, Gebremedhin and Christy cited above,
one may think that (2) would be a more possible cause for the shortage of data. If so, the
Proposal raised below at least could arouse the society to pay more attention to this
1996: 63-4). Compared to white farmers, the outlook for black farmers seems bleak
because they are slightly older, operate a much smaller farm and have much lower gross
sales. The survival strategy of many black operators is to work more days off-farm. (Jones
1994: 27)
As a result, expanding off-farm employment opportunities in rural communities
have enabled families operating small farms to improve their incomes while continuing
farming (Peterson and Brooks 1993: 13). Many (perhaps most) small farms exist only
because of off-farm income. Thus, rural development is an important means to sustain
small farms. (Tweeten & Amponsah 1996: 93). In fact, an econometric analysis using
county-level data from 2 323 rural (nonmetro) counties (excluding those in Alaska and
Hawaii, and Virginia municipalities) for 1980-90 found that those counties in which off-
farm income was relatively important had stabilized or even increased rural population
(Goetz & Debertin 1996: 518, 528-9).
Small farmers could not satisfactorily combine farming and off-farm work.
Although most small farm families make their living by combining farm and off-farm
activities (Ahearn 1996: 95), this does not ensure the survival of their farm operation on
one hand, because it reduces their time available for farm work, causes decreased
productivity and limits farm expansion (Jones 1994: 27); on the other, by the same
rationale, part-time farming also cuts down their time available for off-farm work,
constrains them on learning advanced knowledge and hinders them from obtaining posts
with higher pay.
In fact, some small farm operators hold full-time jobs in the cities and do farming
only at night and on weekends, thus unable to take care of land and production. Many of
them work in the secondary labor market of the small rural towns, receiving low wages
corresponding to their educational backgrounds and practical experience. (Gebremedhin
& Christy 1996: 64)1213
phenomenon and start to collect relevant data.
Part-time farming by small farmers did not prevent their exiting farming.
Although part-time farming has resisted to some extent the general trend towards fewer
but larger farms, it has not reversed it. Thus Peterson and Brooks (1993: 13) envisage that
the farm sector will continue to move in the direction of greater concentration in the
remaining years of this century and the next.
In conclusion, many small farmers have chosen farming as an occupation because
of the values they attach to farm work, including the opportunity to be one's own boss
(Gebremedhin & Christy 1996: 64). As a result, small farms with annual gross sales below
$ 25 000 (accounting for 62.8 % in total farm number, but only 4.9 % in total gross sales;
62.3 % had operators who worked off-farm; and 28.9 % had operators 65 years old or
over in 1992) were operated by full owners of land rather than part owners or tenants;
and on average the operators of these farms had negative net income from farming alone
(Table 3. Brooks & Kalbacher 1990. Tweeten 1994. Tweeten & Amponsah 1996: 89,
91).
Thus, the preference to be one's own boss led to full owners, who were unable
to expand small farms, that resulted in loss-making farming, and further required
supplementary off-farm work, which has only slowed but not prevented their gradual and
eventual being crowded out from agriculture.
Off-farm activities have been promoted only as a subordinate occupation.
The promotion of off-farm employment has been supported by many, almost without
disagreement. But it is still generally regarded as subordinate to the independent small
farming, which, although a loss-making enterprise, is upheld as the major occupation for
small farmers. Hence a relatively passive and reluctant engagement. 
It is important to note that inefficient land-holding has also appeared, for many
small farms `get most of their income from off-farm sources and continue to subsidize their
way of life even through multi-years of not making any money on the farm' (Perry 1999).
Two Vital Dilemmas
The US government policies shifted from one unfunctionable extreme, i.e, a
protective safety net during 1933-96 when the Democrats controlled the Congress, to
another, i.e., free market forces since the adoption of the 1996 Farm Bill after the14
Republicans dominated the Congress in 1994. But the Democrats still would like to
restore the previous safety net partially or completely. In fact, President Clinton (1996)
declares that `I am signing H.R. 2854 (1996 Farm Bill) with reservation because I believe
the bill fails to provide an adequate safety net for family farmers. The fixed payments in the
bill do not adjust to changes in market conditions, which would leave farmers, and the
rural communities in which they live, vulnerable to reductions in crop prices or yields. I am
firmly committed to submitting legislation and working with the Congress next year to
strengthen the farm safety net.' The continuous Republican control of the Congress since
1994 has prevented him from doing so. But even if the Democrats did gain the control of
the Congress in the future, e.g., in 2000, and restore the safety net, two vital dilemmas
would still not be solved: (1) For raising domestic efficiency and international competitive-
ness, large farms should be promoted, while for conserving environmental landscape, rural
communities and democracy roots, and reducing rural poverty, small farms should be
preserved. These two goals seem contradictory. (2) Full or partial restoration of the
previous protective safety net would not only bring back its drawbacks (market
distortions, budget burden, bureaucracy, etc.), but also, even such a net could not change
the trend towards fewer but larger farms as proved since 1933, while without such a net,
small farmers would face stronger squeezing power of free market forces. No solution has
ever been found to stop the swinging between these two unworkable extremes. Therefore,
Browne, Allen and Schweikhardt (1997) lament that `the road to agricultural policy reform
has a long way to go'.
A Conjectural Proposal
Content. In order to find a way out of oscillating between the two unfunctionable
extremes of protective safety net (1933-96) and free market forces (1996-), to achieve
the two necessary but seemingly contradictory aims of not only strengthening large but also
preserving small farms, a new round of institutional changes is proposed here. This would
focus on the promotion of part ownership of land and off-farm activities with either
a Dual Land System or Single Land System, i.e., small farmers, being engaged in off-
farm activities, retain self-sufficiency land (under the Dual Land System) or family plots
(under the Single Land System) as small farms, and lease production land to competent
farmers (including some small farmers) as part owners (who either are already, or could15
become, large farmers) to strengthen the existing, or form new, large farms. Small farmers
would thus hold a triple status or possess three principal occupations: off-farm workers,
bosses of self-operated small farms, and landlords in leasing to part owners.
Dual Land System. Where off-farm activities are not yet highly developed and
most small farmers working there have not secured jobs, their farmland could be divided
into self-sufficiency land to be kept for producing food grains and vegetables for the
family, and production land to be leased to competent farmers as part owners.
Single Land System. Alternatively, where off-farm activities are highly developed
and most small farmers have secured jobs there, they could keep a family plot for
growing vegetables to accommodate farmers' tradition of not buying them from the
market, and lease the rest of farmland as production land to competent farmers as part
owners. Small farmers would not need to retain self-sufficiency land because they could
use off-farm income to buy food. Since a family plot would be much smaller than a self-
sufficiency land, from quantitative point of view, agricultural land is no longer divided into
the Dual Land. Hence a Single  Land  System.  Reducing  self-sufficiency  land  to  family
plots  correspondingly makes the farming scale of the production land by part owners
much larger than under the Dual Land System. Nevertheless, family plots for self-use by
small farmers still constitute small farms.
The Dual Land System and Single Land System could co-exist in one locality, if
some small farmers are already willing to concentrate on off-farm activities and only retain
the smaller family plots, while others still wish to keep the larger self-sufficiency land.
Following the development of off-farm activities to higher levels, more and more small
farmers could secure jobs there and lease more land to part owners, the Dual Land
System would evolve into the Single Land System.
Although physically it would be unimaginable that someday the whole of American
farmland would be merged into one super-large farm, and legally the US anti-trust law
would not allow such a situation, the general trend towards fewer but larger farms may still
continue, due to domestic and international competitive pressure. Yesterday's large farms
may become today's small farms still (Gebremedhin & Christy 1996: 60). But, in this
dynamic process, part owners could become larger through merging and renting in more
land, and small farmers as landlords would not be crowded out but integrated.16
Considering the old and female land owners are already willing to rent out land,
able-bodied male small farmers should be emphatically encouraged to do so. Of course,
some of them who are competent could rent in land to become large farmers.
Small farmers' housing land together with their houses would constitute part of the
small farms, dotted in the landscape.
Absentees could choose to lease the whole land without keeping any for self-use.
But absenteeism is not advocated here, taking into account both American small farmers'
traditional preference to be one's own boss on land and the need for small farms as part
of the environmental landscape.
Of course, if some small farmers are willing (rather than forced) to transfer land
ownership and quit farming for better full-time off-farm jobs, this should be encouraged,
just as Jefferson states in 1785 but overlooked by many.
The interventions of the federal, state and local governments should be reoriented
chiefly in two dimensions: (1) Not to foster independent small farming, but guide,
encourage and help small farmers to lease production land to part owners to form large
farms; it is essential to lead small farmers to realize that independent small farming would
be unsustainable, and no government assistance could be strong enough to rescue them,
hence `joining or perishing'; favorable tax and credit treatment and transitory direct income
support may be given to those who rent out land and develop off-farm activities. (2) To
guide small farmers to treat off-farm employment, not passively because of no other choice
and as a subordinate engagement, but actively as one of their three principal occupations;
and help them to actively develop overall off-farm activities to generate more employment
opportunities and construct rural communities. Vigorous experiments are both beneficial
and necessary. 
Significance. Large farms would be strengthened since leasing the production
land by small farmers to competent farmers as part owners could increase their farm size,
and accordingly their domestic and international competitiveness. Numerous small lands,
which are loss-making when operated by small farmers, would become profitable after
they have been leased to part owners. Land resources are thus better allocated and
utilized.
Small farmers would share the reinforced strength of part owner large17
farmers. Technologies (mechanical, divisible, biochemical, environmental, informational,
etc.), managerial resources, rural development, procurement and marketing facilities which
have thus far mainly favored large farmers would no more be antagonistic to small farmers
but could be enjoyed by them because they are now also a part of the large farmers. By
joining large farmers and sharing their strength, small farmers would no longer be
vulnerable and could retain ownership of their small farmland and receive land rent
permanently. Improving the quality and productivity of farmland which small farmers have
neither time nor resources to do due to being engaged in off-farm work and weak capacity
could now be performed by large farmers, since part owners not only would gain
incentives to do so through informal short-term but actual long-term leasing, and shared
investment in input costs, but also possess advanced technologies, managerial resources
and sufficient capital to do so. Small farmers could thus release more time to gain
advanced knowledge so as to obtain better off-farm employment. They are not only still
their own bosses on the self-sufficiency land or family plots, but also become bosses of
others, i.e., part owners who rent in their land, and could thus exert power of ownership
control. The dynamic process of farms' becoming fewer and larger would not be at the
expenses of squeezing out small farmers, as they would be integrated by part owner large
farmers through merging and renting in more land. 
Inefficient land-holding by small farmers could be resolved, for the many small
farmers who `get most of their income from off-farm sources and continue to subsidize
their way of life even through multi-years of not making any money on the farm' (as cited
above) could lease the part of the loss-making farm beyond self-need to part owners, so
that part owners could achieve economies of scale, they earn rent, and land be efficiently
used.
The landscape, rural communities and democracy roots would be conserved,
as the small farms including their houses constitute environmental scenes, the development
of off-farm activities strengthens rural communities, and the preservation of small farmers
also preserves their votes.
The government would be relieved from the unbearable burden of small
farmers. The traditional interventions provided small farmers with Farm Ownership
Loans for buying land, Farm Operating Loans for buying equipment, refinancing debts,18
etc. They were impotent, however, in the face  of  the overwhelming strength of large
farmers. It would be impractical to increase such loans to so many small farmers to such
an extent that they could resist large farmers or become large themselves. The safety net
designed to protect small farmers during 1933-96 ended up with assisting large farmers
more than those it was devised to help and therefore failed. The 1996 Farm Bill
introduced in a stronger bias in favor of large and against small farmers. In contrast,
according to the Proposal, the government subsidies the cost of which has been borne by
taxpayers and consumers would be partially or even fully replaced by land rent paid by
large farmers to small farmers and increased off-farm income both of which are yielded
within rural areas and could be permanent.
The two-tier or bimodal system of agriculture, including a few large corporate
farms and most farmers on part-time farming with off-farm work or on welfare as
advocated by the Committee for Economic Development (CED 1974: 25) could be
integrated, with the difference that the land rent and increased off-farm income may partly
or even completely replace the government welfare provisions.
Therefore, by solving the first vital dilemma, i.e., realizing the two seemingly
contradictory aims of preserving small while strengthening large farms, the Proposal would
accordingly also resolve the second, i.e., the government's swaying between protective
safety net and free market forces. The Proposal would thus lead to the achievement of the
essential and interdependent goals of sustainable agricultural and rural development as
defined by FAO in 1991 `Food security, to be obtained by ensuring an appropriate and
sustainable balance between self-sufficiency and self-reliance; employment and income
generation in rural areas, particularly to eradicate poverty; and natural resource
conservation and environmental protection.' (SDD-FAO 1995: 1)
A new Columbus's tragedy? In 1492, Columbus disembarked on a new
continent but still believed it to be the India of Asia. Until the 1950s, full ownership by
farm families was considered the `ideal' system of land tenure (Janssen 1993: 473). But
since then, small farmers, economists and policy makers have seen the success of part
owners as their performance has been regularly reported. Why do they still stick to the
declining independent small farming? Isn't it a new Columbus's tragedy? If so, the old one
may be excused as Columbus had little time to make research. But how to explain that19
after 50 years of intensive studies by so many, part ownership is still not promoted and is
even ignored?
The new Columbus's tragedy has mainly been caused by the failure to solve two
fundamental contradictions. First, on one hand, in order to realize Jefferson's spirit of
retaining democracy roots, small farmers should be preserved. On the other, the `ideal' full
owners in Jefferson's `yeoman' model have been too weak to sustain. Thus even `Jefferson
himself operated a commercial plantation with slave labor, producing crops for market,
and importing goods from England', and `the structure of American agriculture never
followed the Jeffersonian model' (Rasmussen & Stanton 1993: 32). As the `yeomen' being
crowded out, the democracy roots also have been cut. Therefore, Jefferson's specific
`yeoman' model is the exact opposite to his spirit. But, in the USA, no one dared oppose
Jefferson's spirit (at least openly). Many politicians have even been eager to show that they
are the most fervent to it in order to win votes. Thus, although it is well known that
promotion of independent small farming is unfeasible and may only result in the cutting of
democracy roots, being unable to resolve this contradiction, people have to stick to it.
Now the Proposal may provide a solution: Jefferson's model is simply modified from
`yeomen' to small farmers, because these two concepts are not necessarily the same. By
retaining self-sufficiency land or family plots and leasing the rest of farmland to part
owners, small farmers are maintained, and hence also the roots of democracy, although
they are no more full owner `yeomen' as before.
The second contradiction may be related to the American small farmers' traditional
preference to be one's own boss. On one hand, if they lease land to part owners, they
would lose this status. On the other, if they operate land themselves, they would make loss
and be crowded out. Many old and female small farmers choose to be nonoperator
landlords, because they are not able-bodied. But most able-bodied male small farmers,
being unable to overcome this contradiction, stick to operating land themselves, and earn
supplementary off-farm income, but still cannot avoid the fate of being squeezed out. The
Proposal, by separating small farmers' land into self-sufficiency land or family plots upon
which they are still their own bosses and the rest of land which is leased to part owners,
may also settle this contradiction. In so doing, the promotion of part ownership and
maintenance of small farmers could be combined, and small and large farmers integrated.20
This Proposal might be relevant to other OECD countries with a large versus small
bimodal farm structure in general as well.
















1850 1 449   299 203
1860 2 044  4.11   407  0.36 199 -0.20
1870 2 670  3.06   408  0.02 153 -2.31
1880 4 009  5.01   536  3.14 134 -1.24
1890 4 565  1.39   623  1.62 137  0.22
1900 5 737  2.57   839  3.46 146  0.66
1910 6 362  1.09   879  0.48 138 -0.55
1920 6 448  0.14   956  0.88 148  0.72
1930 6 546  0.15   987  0.32 151  0.20
1935 6 814  0.82 1 055  1.38 155  0.53
1940 6 350 -1.36 1 061  0.11 167  1.55
1950 5 648 -1.11 1 202  1.33 213  2.75
1954 4 798 -3.76 1 206  0.08 251  4.46
1959 4 105 -2.88 1 183 -0.38 288  2.95
1964 3 457 -3.16 1 146 -0.63 332  3.06
1969 3 000 -2.64 1 108 -0.66 369  2.23
1974 2 795 -1.37 1 084 -0.43 388  1.03
1978 2 436 -3.21 1 045 -0.90 429  2.64
1982 2 241 -2.00   987 -1.39 440  0.64
1987 2 088 -1.37   964 -0.47 460  0.91
1992 1 925 -1.56   946 -0.37 498  1.65
* The census of agriculture is taken every five-year covering the years ending in `2' and `7' and
includes as a farm every place from which $ 1 000 or more of agricultural products were produced and
sold or normally would have been sold during the census year (NASS 1998).
Sources: 1850-1910: SAUS 1920: 138. 1920: SAUS 1949: 613. 1930-78: SAUS 1984: 652. 1982-92: SAUS
1997: 665.21
Table 2  Percentage in Farm Number by Farm Size (acre) in the USA 1910-92
Size 1910 1935 1950 1959 1969 1978 1987 1992
Small < 10  5.3  8.4  9.0  6.5  5.9  6.7  8.8  8.6
10-49 30.1 31.2 27.5 21.9 17.3 17.4 19.7 20.2
Small subtotal < 50 35.4 39.5 36.5 28.4 23.2 24.1 28.5 28.8
Lower medium 50-259 54.8  49.7 49.1 49.8 47.9 44.0  40.1 39.3
Upper medium *
260-499 12.7 15.3 15.4  13.7 13.2



































Large 260-499  7.0   6.9  8.9
500-999  2.0   2.5  3.4 5.4  7.9
1 000-  
1 999
 0.8  1.3  2.3
3.7
 3.3  4.3  4.9  5.3
> 1 999  2.2  2.8  3.2  3.7
















* Stanton invariably classifies farms of 260-499 acres and 500-999 acres as large farms from 1900 through 1987 (Stanton 1993: 49-50),
which may overlook the dynamic changes of farm size distributions. Actually farms of 260-499 acres and 500-999 acres started to decline
in the 1950s and 1970s respectively. Thus the author downgrades them from large to medium farms from 1959 and 1978 onwards
respectively accordingly, and calls those with 50-259 acres as lower medium farms, and those with 260-999 acres as upper medium farms
(this dynamic classification is not seen in the literature)
Sources: 1910-35: SAUS 1939: 613. 1950-59: SAUS 1962: 610. 1969: SAUS 1979: 687. 1978: SAUS 1992: 645. 1987-92: SAUS 1997:
665.22

























2 087 100 850    407 100  18 919    9.1 100
 2 500 - 
4 999
  882  42.3 169    191
medium
 19.9   3 093    3.5  16.3
 5 000-  
 9 999
  721  34.5 215    298
large
 25.3   4 894    6.8  25.9
 10 000 &
more
  484  23.2 466    963
large
 54.8  10 932   22.6  57.8









2 067 100 940    455 100  29 003   14.0 100
 2 500-   
4 999
  618  29.9 119    192 lo-
med
 12.6   2 275    3.7   7.8
 5 000-   
9 999
  654  31.6 189    288 up-
med
 20.1   4 723    7.2  16.3
 10 000-
19 999
  483  23.4 215    445 up-
med
 22.9   6 705   13.9  23.1
 20 000-
39 999
  210  10.2 166    791
large
 17.7   5 648   26.8  19.5
 40 000 &
more
  102   4.9 252  2 466
large
 26.8   9 652   94.5  33.3
 20 000 &
more
large
 15.1     791-
2 466
large
 44.5  52.8
Below     2
500
1 638 100 140     86 100   1 514    0.9 100
 50-2 499   349  21.3  37    106 lo-
med
 26.4     461    1.3  30.4

























 2 500-  
 4 999
  395  22.8  76    192 lo-
med
  8.3   1 346    3.4   3.0
 5 000-   
9 999
  390  22.5 107    274 up-
med
 11.6   2 814    7.2   6.3
 10 000-
19 999
  395  22.8 171    433 up-
med
 18.6   5 693   14.4  12.8
 20 000-
39 999
  331  19.1 207    626
large
 22.6   9 267   28.0  20.8
 40 000-
99 999
  170   9.8 185  1 092
large
 20.2  10 073   59.3  22.6
 100 000 &
more
   52   3.0 172  3 304
large
 18.7  15 282  293.8  34.5
 20 000 &
more
large
 31.9    626- 3
304
large
 61.5  77.9
Below     2
500
  994 100  90     90 100     935    0.9 100
 50-2 499   193  19.4  19     96 lo-
med
 20.8     188    1.0  20.1




1 865 100 927    497 100 107 164   57.5 100
 2 500-   
4 999
  332  17.8  37    112 lo-
med
  4.0   1 191    3.6   1.1
 5 000-   
9 999
  331  17.7  56    168 lo-
med
  6.0   2 361    7.1   2.2
 10 000-
19 999
  310  16.6  84    272 up-
med
  9.1   4 425   14.3   4.1
 20 000-
39 999
  306  16.4 133    435 up-
med
 14.3   8 788   28.7   8.2
 40 000-   
99 999
  363  19.5 245    675 up-
med




  223  12.0 372  1 669
large
 40.1  67 339  302.0  62.8
Below 2
500
  612 100  47     77 lo-
med
100     705    1.2 100





















1987 total 2 088 100 965    462 100 136 049   65.2 100
10 000 &
more
1 060  50.8 829    782  86.1 132 645  125.2  97.5
 10 000-   
24 999
  326  15.6  92    283 up-
med
  9.6   5 244   16.1   3.9
 25 000-   
49 999
  220  10.5 111    504 up-
med
 11.5   7 869   35.8   5.8
 50 000-   
99 999
  218  10.4 162    743 up-
med
 16.8  15 661   71.8  11.5
 100 000-  
249 000
  203   9.7 225  1 111
large
 23.3  31 178  153.9  22.9
 250 000-  
499 999
   61   2.9 114  1 858
large
 11.8  20 740  339.2  15.2
 500 000-  
999 999
   21   1.0  63  3 002
large
  6.5  14 076  672.5  10.3
1 000 000
& more
   11   0.5  63  5 655
large







 48.1  76.2
Below    
10 000
1 028  49.2 135    132  14.0   3 404    3.3   2.5
 Below    2
500
  490  23.5  60    122 lo-
med
  6.2     498    1.0   0.4
 2 500-   
4 999
  263  12.6  30    114 lo-
med
  3.1     946    3.6   0.7
 5 000-   
9 999
  275  13.2  46    166 lo-
med
  4.7   1 960    7.1   1.4
1992 total 1 925 100 946    491 100 162 608   84.5 100
10 000 &
more
1 019  52.9 822    807  86.9 159 565  156.6  98.1
 10 000-   
24 999
  302  15.7  82    271 up-
med
  8.7   4 841   16.0   3.0
 25 000-   
49 999
  195  10.1  91    477 up-
med
  9.7   6 967   35.7   4.3
 50 000-   
99 999
  188   9.8 134    713 up-
med
 14.2  13 517   72.0   8.3
 100 000-  
249 000
  208  10.8 228  1 094
large





















 250 000-  
499 999
   79   4.1 131  1 666
large
 13.8  26 914  342.7  16.6
 500 000-  
999 999
   31   1.6  81  2 598
large
  8.5  20 953  675.4  12.9
1 000 000
& more
   16   0.8  76  4 751
large




 17.3  1 094-
4 751
large
 54.4  82.6
Below   
10 000
  907  47.1 124    136  13.1   3 043    3.4   1.9
 Below    
2 500
  423  22.0  56    132 lo-
med
  5.9     411    1.0   0.3
 2 500-     
4 999
  232  12.1  27    116 lo-
med
  2.8     836    3.6   0.5
 5 000-   
9 999
  252  13.1  41    162 lo-
med
  4.3   1 797    7.1   1.1
* Large, lower medium (lo-med) and upper medium (up-med) sizes in acreage as in Table 2.
Sources: 1949: SAUS 1964: 615. 1959: SAUS 1976: 635. 1969-78: SAUS 1981: 663. 1987: SAUS 1991: 648.
1992: SAUS 1997: 666.26
Table 4  Farm Number (1 000) under Different Tenure of Operator (1 000) in the
USA 1900-92
Year Total No. Full owner % Part owner % Tenant* % *
1900 5737 3202 55.8 451  7.9 2084 36.3
1910 6362 3355 52.7 594  9.3 2413 37.9
1920 6448 3367 52.2 559  8.7 2523 39.2
1935 6812 3210 47.1 689 10.1 2913 42.8
1940 6097 3084 50.6 615 10.1 2398 39.3
1950 5382 3090 57.4 825 15.3 1468 27.3
1959 3711 2119 57.1 811 21.9  760 20.5
1969 2730 1706 62.5 672 24.6  353 12.9
1978 2479 1451 58.6 714 28.8  314 12.7
1982 2241 1326 59.2 656 29.3  259 11.5
1987 2088 1239 59.3 609 29.2  240 11.5
1992 1925 1112 57.7 597 31.0  217 11.3
* 1900-59 included data for managers.
Sources: 1900-35: SAUS 1939: 615. 1940-50: SAUS 1964: 618. 1959-78: SAUS
1984: 653. 1987-92: SAUS 1997: 665.27
Table 5  Farm Acreage (million acres) under Different Tenure of Operator










1900  839 431 51.4 125 14.9 283 33.7
1910  879 465 52.9 134 15.2 280 31.9
1920  956 461 48.3 176 18.4 319 33.4
1935 1055 391 37.1 266 25.2 397 37.7
1940 1061 382 36.0 300 28.3 378 35.6
1950 1159 419 36.2 422 36.4 317 27.4
1959 1124 349 31.0 498 44.3 167 14.9
1969 1063 375 35.2 550 51.8 138 13.0
1978 1030 341 33.1 565 54.9 124 12.0
1982 987 342 34.7 531 53.8 114 11.6
1987 964 318 32.9 520 53.9 127 13.2
1992 946 296 31.3 527 55.7 123 13.0
* 1900-59 included data for managers.
Sources: 1900-35: SAUS 1939: 615. 1940-50: SAUS 1964: 618. 1959-78: SAUS
1984: 653. 1982-92: SAUS 1997: 665.28
Table 6  Farm Number (1 000) and Percentage by Tenure of Operator in Different
Farm Acreage in the USA 1978-92





1978 * 2479 1451 58.6 714 28.8 314 12.7
Under 50  690  532 77.1  74 10.8  84 12.2
50-179  814  563 69.2 157 19.3  94 11.5
180-499  596  262 43.9 247 41.4  87 14.7
500-999  215   57 26.5 128 59.5  30 14.0
1000 & over  161   36 22.4 107 66.2  18 11.4
1982 2241 1326 59.2 656 29.3 259 11.5
Under 50  637  505 79.3  68 10.7  63  9.9
50-179  711  489 68.7 144 20.2  79 11.1
180-499  526  232 44.1 221 42.0  73 13.8
500-999  204   57 27.9 120 58.8  27 13.2
1000 & over  161   41 25.4 103 64.0  17 10.6
1987 2088 1239 59.3 609 29.2 240 11.5
Under 50  596  483 81.1  59  9.9  53  9.0
50-179  645  449 69.6 130 20.1  66 10.3
180-499  478  217 45.3 195 40.8  67 13.9
500-999  200   53 26.3 117 58.3  31 15.4
1000 & over  169   37 22.1 108 64.2  23 13.7
1992 1925 1112 57.7 597 31.0 217 11.3
Under 50  554  444 80.1  58 10.5  52  9.4
50-179  584  395 67.6 130 22.3  59 10.1
180-499  428  190 44.4 183 42.8  55 12.8
500-999  186   48 25.8 111 59.7  27 14.5
1000 & over  173   35 20.2 114 65.9  24 13.9
* Earlier data unavailable.
Sources: 1978: SAUS 1984: 653. 1982: SAUS 1989: 629. 1987: SAUS 1994: 666.
1992: SAUS 1997: 665.29
Table 7  Average Variable Cash and Economic Costs for Corn (1987), Soybean
(1986), Wheat (1986) Production by Tenure of Operator in the USA




Corn Soybean Wheat Corn Soybean Wheat
Full owner 0.98 1.45 1.74 2.06 4.71 4.41
Part owner 1.00 1.43 1.30 2.17 4.61 3.38
Some share,
no cash
0.91 1.22 1.20 2.20 4.41 3.30
Some cash,
no share
1.13 1.71 1.38 2.24 5.09 3.52
Both cash &
share
0.96 1.37 1.32 2.07 4.32 3.32
Sources: USDA 1986a. USDA 1986b. USDA 1987.30
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